How Hostile was the Space Race?  An Examination of Soviet-American  Antagonism and Cooperation in Space by Mundorff, Mitchell
University of Kentucky
UKnowledge
Lewis Honors College Capstone Collection Lewis Honors College
2016
How Hostile was the Space Race? An Examination
of Soviet-American Antagonism and Cooperation
in Space
Mitchell Mundorff
University of Kentucky, mitchell.mundorff@gmail.com
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/honprog
Part of the Diplomatic History Commons, Other Classics Commons, Other History Commons,
Other Languages, Societies, and Cultures Commons, Political History Commons, and the United
States History Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis Honors College at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Lewis Honors
College Capstone Collection by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mundorff, Mitchell, "How Hostile was the Space Race? An Examination of Soviet-American Antagonism and Cooperation in Space"















HOW HOSTILE WAS THE SPACE RACE?  
AN EXAMINATION OF SOVIET-AMERICAN  















History 499: America in the 1970s 

















 The day was July 17, 1975.  It was 12:12 in the afternoon by Eastern Daylight Time.  At 
this moment, the first contact was made between spacecraft that had been launched separately 
from the two greatest powers in the world – the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics.  The Apollo capsule that carried American astronauts Thomas 
Stafford, Vance Brand, and Donald Slayton connected with the Soyuz 19 craft piloted by Soviet 
cosmonauts Alexey Leonov and Valery Kubasov.1  As the world watched a television broadcast 
of the event, it was clear that much had changed over the two decades since the first man-made 
satellite was launched into orbit.  Not only were the USA and the USSR no longer directly 
competing with one and other, they were in fact on a joint mission which very visibly 
demonstrated the lack of animosity between the two space programs.  This flight would have 
been unimaginable to a person who watched the first fifteen years of space exploration play out, 
and yet – here it was. 
This proof of cooperation between the states had been a long time in the making, as talks 
between the respective space agencies had begun no later than 1971, and showed that in some 
areas, the differences between the superpowers could be overcome in order to make meaningful 
progress together.  To the casual observer, this type of collaboration made little sense.  The 
Space Race had begun with the USSR’s launch of Sputnik in 1957, and quickly escalated into a 
serious of missions by each nation meant to show their technological superiority over the other.  
With the success of Apollo 11 just twelve years later in 1969 and the successful landing of 
humans on the moon for the first time, the United States had proved that it was able to speed up 
and even pass the Soviet Union in a realm that had originally belonged to Moscow.  Despite the 
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antagonism between the USA and the USSR between the end of World War II and the beginning 
of the 1990s, the two powers in fact were helped by the existence of their opposite, and even in 
some cases work together, as evidenced by Apollo-Soyuz. 
 As the 1960s drew to a close, the average American would not have expected anything 
like Apollo-Soyuz to take place as soon as the middle of the next decade.  Richard Nixon had 
been elected president in 1968, and had a background as a staunch anti-communist who was fully 
invested in the success of the capitalist world.  In Vietnam, the nation’s military was involved in 
a war that was already quite unpopular at home, but that the government insisted was necessary 
to keep the spread of communism through Southeast Asia in check.  The space race itself was in 
full gear, and when Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin landed on the moon in July of 1969, they 
finally proved the success of NASA over the Soviet Academy of Sciences.  Though there was 
room to question the success of the United States in its battle against communism, there was 
little evidence to show that cooperation between the two nations was just a few years away.  
Thus, the arrival of President Nixon’s détente policies caught much of the world off guard. 
 The strategy adopted by Nixon and his advisor (and later Secretary of State) Henry 
Kissinger was one that deliberately pushed for the continuation of the Soviet Union as a world 
power.  As Daniel Sargent wrote in his book A Superpower Transformed, “[D]étente aimed to 
preserve American international primacy through the construction of a geopolitical balance that 
would preserve–not resolve–the bipolar schism that had opened in the 1940s… The Nixon 
administration nonetheless accepted that the Cold War was permanent–and even hailed the Cold 
War as a source of Washington’s power over its allies.”2 This was then supposed to lead to the 
West staying allied together under the leadership of the USA, as any rupture in party lines would 
                                                          
2 Daniel Sargent, A Superpower Transformed, The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 61. 
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allow the powerful enemy to take advantage and gain even more territory and resources.  The 
new introduction to the situation was the rise of communist China, whose political break from 
the Soviet Union showed that Mao’s nation had its own goals in the international sphere.   No 
longer was China interested in merely being a puppet of the most powerful communist nation in 
the world.  Having two countries that shared some of the same spheres of influence was useful to 
Nixon, as he could move closer to one or the other when attempting to put pressure on his 
opponents.  Of course, neither China nor the USSR wanted to see the Americans permanently 
ally themselves with the other nation at their own expense, meaning that they could be 
influenced by these threats of Nixon.  If the United States were ever to declare one of the two 
nations a communist friend to democracy, the other would have no chance of victory in any sort 
of ensuing military conflict. 
 President Nixon’s ability to extend a hand to these communist countries was enhanced by 
the fact that he was a known opponent of such regimes.  There was no chance that his political 
enemies within America could have pinned a label such as “communist lover” on a man who had 
made his name for his efforts to reduce communism in his own government less than two 
decades prior.  This freedom allowed Nixon to be the first president to visit Beijing under the 
rule of the communist government, and the first to travel to the Soviet Union since the end of the 
Second World War.  Anybody who had previously been “soft on communism” would have been 
crushed by the press and their opponents within American politics if they had attempted such 
maneuvers.  In this way, a person in opposition to the ideology of the USSR became the one who 
brought America closer towards it than any other leader since Berlin fell. 
 It was in this way that cooperation between the Americans and the Soviets began to 
increase.  At the Moscow summit of 1972 between President Nixon and General Secretary 
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Brezhnev was another important step down this road.  At this meeting, the signing of the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) accords allowed each nation to legitimize the other’s 
nuclear arms stockpile while agreeing to halt further production.  John Lewis Gaddis explains 
this well in his book The Cold War, writing, “The[ talks] represented an acknowledgement on 
the part of the United States that the Soviet Union was now its equal in nuclear capabilities, and 
in some cases of weaponry its superior.  They legitimized the logic of Mutual Assured 
Destruction: that remaining defenseless against a nuclear attack was the best way to keep one 
from happening.”3  It was not only the United States who found this increased cooperation to be 
useful – the Soviet Union did as well.  With the SALT I accords in place, both countries were 
able to free up portions of their national budget that would otherwise have been spent on 
missiles.  The Soviet Union was able to avoid embarrassment thanks to the fact that it had larger 
numbers of missiles than the USA, while the United States knew that its weapons were more 
advanced and more accurate that those found in the USSR.  Though neither could be completely 
certain that they were not under any threat of attack, the fact that they were able to check up on 
each other’s stockpiles through satellite surveillance reduced the risk of suddenly being informed 
that the enemy had taken a huge leap forward.  The cooperation was beginning to take shape in 
the real world. 
 Although the nations had opposed each other nearly immediately after the end of World 
War II, Soviet and American troops never fought a battle against one and other.  It would be 
impossible to call the United States and the Soviet Union friendly, but they managed to keep 
their aggression from erupting into open warfare.  There were battles fought against the 
principles of the enemy, and close calls such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and Gary Powers’ U-2 
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plane being shot down above the USSR, but knowing how close they could come to mutually 
destroying the world, did not allow this to happen.  In this uneasy manner, the two countries 
coexisted for nearly thirty years.  Yes, there was plenty of rhetoric on both sides as to the 
destructiveness and poor choices made by the other.  But for countries who are often described 
as mortal enemies, there was surprisingly little actual conflict.  With the signing of SALT I, in 
the early 1970s they even began to work together, calling into question even further the idea that 
the Cold War precluded the long-term existence of both the capitalist United States and the 
communist Soviet Union. 
 Another important event that took place at the end of April in 1975 was the Fall of 
Saigon and the evacuation of nearly all American military personnel and civilians from the 
former South Vietnam.4  The war had not been between the two major powers, but in leaving the 
country, the United States admitted that it was not always able to stop the spread of communism, 
and the alternative style of economic organization won an important mental battle.  The 
communists and the capitalists had not just fought to a standstill as they had in Korea.  This was, 
instead, the triumph of a small nation (albeit greatly supported by China) over the most powerful 
capitalist country on the planet.  However, the Sino-Soviet split meant that not all communist 
nations were a single reliable allied bloc any more, and in fact, the American loss in some ways 
harmed the USSR.  By much the same thinking that the Nixon administration used, if the United 
States fell, there would be less for the Chinese to worry about in the event of a conflict between 
the two major communist powers.  This could be an issue in the future, where these two 
countries might become the most influential in the world.  Therefore, the Soviets did not press 
upon the Americans too much on this matter, allowing the facts to speak to themselves rather 
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than injecting a large amount of rhetoric regarding the failures of capitalist imperialism.  To 
insult the US too much at this point might have jeopardized future collaborations between the 
two nations, including one that was to be very important from a public relations standpoint – the 
Apollo-Soyuz space mission. 
 The idea of a joint USA-USSR mission was not, in fact, a particularly new one.  
President John F. Kennedy had a complicated relationship with the idea of whether or not 
scientific achievements in space ought to be viewed through a nationalistic lens.  As Edward and 
Linda Ezell wrote in The Partnership: A NASA History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, “At one 
point, the President called for American domination of the space frontier in the 1960s, and at 
another time he argued that ‘space offers no problems of sovereignty,’ so ‘why, therefore, should 
man's first flight to the moon be a matter of national competition? Why should the United States 
and the Soviet Union, in preparing for such expeditions, become involved in immense 
duplications of research, construction, and expenditure?’”5  These statements were made during 
the summer of 1963,6 approximately six years after the launch of Sputnik and six years before 
the successful conclusion to Apollo 11.   Though the assassination of President Kennedy meant 
that he was no longer able to influence the actions taken by his nation’s space agency, he planted 
the seed that would lead to Apollo-Soyuz over a decade later.  His arguments for joint missions 
are sound: he proposed that in nearly all ways, it would be more efficient for each country to 
allow its scientists to cooperate with the other’s.  A freer flow of information would allow for 
more innovation in terms of new projects building off those that had already been completed, as 
well as avoiding the redundancy of repeating an experiment performed by a different group.   
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(Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1978), Ch. 2-4, 




 It was next to impossible to imagine this being a reality at the time, though, due to the 
extreme level of competition that existed between the nations’ space agencies.  This began 
extremely early, in the days following the end of World War II in Europe.  America and the 
Soviet Union competed to make sure that the best German rocket scientists ended up in their 
spheres of influence, in order to make sure that they could convince them to continue the work 
that they had started under the Nazi regime.  It appeared that the United States had won a serious 
advantage when Wernher von Braun surrendered to their military rather than the Soviet army: 
von Braun was the man who masterminded most of the advances in the Nazi rocketry program.7  
Indeed, securing these type of scientists was such an important consideration for both 
governments that one of the top Soviet officials involved in the rocketry program, Colonel 
Girgori A. Tokady, made an official report regarding the fact that, “We have no leading V-2 
experts in our zone; we have no complete projects or materials of the V-2; we have captured no 
fully operational V-2s which could be test launched right away.”8  In this early stage of what was 
to become the Space Race, America had won. 
 The next decade proved that this victory might not have been as important as originally 
thought.  The United States was not able to take advantage of its wealth of top scientists due to 
inefficiencies of bureaucracy and competition between different branches of the military, none of 
which wanted to fall behind any of the others.  Meanwhile, the Soviet space program was 
making quick progress under the guidance of another brilliant rocket scientist: Sergei Pavlovich 
Korolev.  When the USSR launched the first artificial satellite in October of 1957, the rest of the 
world did not know how to respond.  Both Cold War superpowers had been working, on and off, 
                                                          
7 Gene Eisman and Von Hardesty, Epic Rivalry: The Inside Story of the Soviet and American Space Race 
(Washington, DC: National Geographic, 2007), 20. 
8Matthew Brzezinski, Red Moon Rising: Sputnik and the Hidden Rivalries that Ignited the Space Age (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2007), 12. 
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on such a program for the past twelve years, but few had expected the Soviets to beat the 
Americans to the punch.9  As it turned out, this was the step that it took for the US government 
and NASA to refocus their efforts and create an environment in which the rocket scientists were 
able to be successful.  Although not immediately, soon, the progress was clear.  As Eisman and 
Hardesty wrote, “The four attempts in 1958 all ended in failure.  Another 14 launches in 1959 
garnered nine successes.  The year 1960 showed greater progress, with a record of 12 successful 
tries in 17 attempts.”10  Now it was clear that the countries were both willing and able to focus on 
surpassing one and other in yet another sphere: that of space and rocket technology. 
 Both the United States and the Soviet Union set their sights on that far-flung goal of 
human space travel: landing a man on the moon.  In retrospect, it is clear that it would have taken 
a catastrophe or a minor miracle (depending on one’s point of view) for America to fail to 
achieve this before the USSR.  The Soviet technology was not awful, and could have been used, 
more than likely, for a similar mission to Apollo 11.  What was not present “was the very large 
investment in rubles that would have been required to bring the vehicle to an acceptable state of 
reliability.”11  This left the field of play open to America, and astronauts Buzz Aldrin and Neil 
Armstrong, with the support of all of NASA, would become the first men to walk on the moon 
during July of 1969.  Though the plaque that they left at their landing site read, in part, “WE 
CAME IN PEACE FOR ALL MANKIND,”12 it was clear that this was a mission, primarily, for 
the American people and for the ideology of capitalism.  With names such as Columbia for the 
command module and Eagle for the lunar lander, the mission was unapologetically American.13  
                                                          
9 James Hartford, Korolev: How One Man Masterminded the Soviet Drive to Beat America to the Moon (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1997), 121-123. 
10 Eisman and Hardesty, Epic Rivalry, 101. 
11 Hartford, Korolev, 246. 
12 Eisman and Hardesty, Epic Rivalry, 236. 
13 Ibid, 237. 
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Perhaps it was seeing the success that others could have and wishing to propel all of human 
space exploration forward that lead to Soviet receptiveness to a new American desire to 
cooperate in space. 
Little progress was made on the project of collaboration during this era of competition.  
There was some amount of correspondence between each nation’s space agency, but this was not 
a widely known fact, even within the agencies themselves.14  During these years, the general 
public did not think of space as a location where partnership could be expected or was even 
advisable, necessarily.  However, President Nixon felt that the correspondence between the 
agencies was a promising beginning that should be further explored, “[o]n 10 July 1970… 
publicly confirm[ing] his interest in pursuing discussions of space cooperation, stating that 
negotiations should be conducted at the technical agency level.”15  This step forward meant that 
NASA and the Soviet Academy of Sciences were allowed to engage with one and other more 
openly, but was still far from a guarantee of actual future cooperative missions.  Thanks to the 
fact that both American and Soviet leadership could shift unexpectedly, the current goals could 
not be relied upon to last more than a few years.  In addition, the two countries were still in open 
opposition to one and other, including the ongoing military conflict between capitalism and 
communism in Vietnam.  Though there was reason for optimism for anybody hoping for a future 
filled with collaboration, it was still far from a certain outcome. 
 For the time being, everything was going as well as possibly could have been expected.  
The Moscow and Washington governments organized a meeting between American and Soviet 
representatives from their respective space agencies that was to take place in Moscow itself in 
                                                          




January of 1971.16  The Americans were not sure to what extent they could expect productive 
talks at this meeting, considering that several presidential summits of a similar nature were less 
than fully successful, but decided that taking the opportunity was more important than worrying 
about potential pitfalls.  As it turned out, there was no need to worry: “The U.S. delegation felt 
that the Soviets were surprisingly cooperative and open in their approach, aside from some 
routine haggling over wording.”17  The two groups were able to agree upon five general goals 
that they would work towards, including exchanging more meteorological data, planning 
cooperative meteorological rocket programs, examining the possibility of environmental research 
over international waters, exchanging more detailed information regarding lunar missions, and 
increased exchange of space biology and medicine data.18  These were broad-spectrum goals that 
would not force any particular sets of data to be shared that were deemed sensitive for one reason 
or another by either nation’s government.  They were, though, steps towards the reduction of 
previously mentioned inefficiencies, especially with regards to sharing information so as not to 
repeat experiments that had already been completed.  The fact that the agreement was finalized 
without difficulty also portrayed both sides’ desire for greater contact.  This, for once, appeared 
to be an area in which the two nations could work together without extremely large levels of 
friction. 
 This victory was only to be built upon during the remaining years of President Nixon’s 
tenure in office.  All of the members involved on the American side of the agreement felt that 
everything had gone smoothly enough to indicate that space agency cooperation could be 
included as part of the platform of Nixon and Brezhnev’s Moscow Summit in 1972.19  Despite 
                                                          
16 Ibid, Ch. 5, http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP-4209/ch5-1.htm 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid, Ch. 6-11, www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP-4209/ch6-11.htm. 
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Nixon’s public call two years prior for increased collaboration between the nations in this realm, 
few people were aware of the extent to which it had increased.  Only minimal details of further 
agreements had been released, and it is unlikely that many private citizens expected the USA and 
USSR to go so far as to have a docking of craft in orbit.  However, that is just what was 
announced on May 24, 1972, when NASA Administrator James C. Fletcher appeared at the 
White House to discuss the successes that were being achieved while the President was in 
Moscow.  As he went on to say, and the Ezells would write, “Of the various planned enterprises, 
‘the most dramatic . . . will involve the rendezvous and docking of a U.S. spacecraft with a 
Russian Soyuz spacecraft in 1975.’”20 
 This was a monumental step forward in terms of concrete results for those who had long 
advocated for greater cooperation between NASA and the Academy of Sciences.  The fact that 
just three years after landing the first human beings on the moon, the United States was able to 
agree to work together with the Soviet Union on a joint mission shows a lack of overconfidence 
and a sense of scientific community that transcends borders.  The same can be said in the 
opposite direction as well; it would have been easy for the Soviets to denounce any American 
accomplishments in the Space Race as capitalist nonsense that did not involve vital research such 
as that conducted in the USSR.  Thankfully, the two nations were able to set aside their 
differences and work in ways that would benefit both themselves and others to a much greater 
extent than any solo missions might have done. 
 Work soon got underway on what was to be officially named the Apollo-Soyuz Test 
Project (or Союз-Аполлон Экспериментальный Полет, the Soyuz-Apollo Experimental Flight, 
for the Soviet Union).  A meeting was scheduled in Houston for early July, less than two months 




after the official announcement of the two nations working together.21    NASA assembled teams, 
preliminary plans were made, goals were set, and then the Soviet scientists flew in.  When the 
two groups ended up in the same room together, things seemed a lot more difficult than they had 
during the month of planning the meeting.  Notes from the first meeting included, “Don't seem to 
be able to complete anything quickly… Translations cannot be trusted… Russian language takes 
about twice as long to say as does English.”22  The mere act of moving from one language to 
another turned out to be incredibly difficult for the people who were working on this project.  
Since many of the translators did not know the jargon of the foreign language to the level that 
was required, they had to try to create workaround, but ended up using words that the scientists 
themselves would never have chosen.  They soon realized that diagrams were much easier for the 
other side to understand than any words.23  Diagrams could intuitively be understood by both 
groups of scientists, who then could teach their translators the words that would describe the 
types of things that they wanted to change.  Naturally, this process sped up as the talks went on, 
resulting in preliminary agreements regarding protocol and a decision to meet again in Moscow 
in three months. 
 On October 7, 27 members of NASA arrived in the Soviet Union.24  The people in charge 
of designing the flight were able to make headway on the project, and the talks were very 
productive.  One issue, though, was that the Soviets seemed to be insistent upon proving their 
nation’s boasts about being the leaders in space, and were often reluctant to admit that their craft 
might have capabilities lower than that of the Apollo capsule.  Looking back, one of the 
American scientists involved said, “They seemed to embarrass easily about the capability of their 
                                                          
21 Ibid, Ch. 7-1, http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP-4209/ch7-1.htm. 
22 Ibid, Ch. 7-2, http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP-4209/ch7-2.htm. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid, Ch. 7-3, http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP-4209/ch7-3.htm. 
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spacecraft, which they had no need to do. Their spacecraft was designed for a different thing that 
Apollo was.”25  Once openings were made in this area, with Americans reassuring the Soviets 
that they could work within the limitations of the Soyuz craft, the talks began to move forward 
even more quickly.  Plans were set regarding design decisions and other details, and each side 
was then able to begin making specific arrangements for their mission specifications.  Everything 
seemed to be on the path that it needed to in order to ensure that the July 1975 launch date was 
met. 
 Although things had gone well up until this point, there were still suspicions within 
NASA about the capabilities of the Soviet space agency and the safety of the flights that it 
undertook.  Therefore, the United States proposed a Mid-Term Review in October of 1973, in 
which members of both nation’s agencies could pose questions to one and other and get answers 
about things that were bothering them.  For the USA, the main issues were those of, “Soviet 
hardware failures (Soyuz 11 and Salyut 2), joint participation in test and flight preparation 
activities, project milestones, and the preparation of documentation.”26  Without reassurance 
about the technical capabilities of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, many average Americans 
(and even some within the aeronautic community) were worried about their failure rate and their 
ability to protect American lives.  This conference, which took place in the USSR in October of 
1973, covered the failures of Soyuz 11 and Salyut 2, which took no small amount of convincing 
on the part of Soviet regulators to allow their American colleagues to know.  Their openness and 
the fact that the failures themselves proved quite fixable led the American delegation to the 
conclusion that this would be a safe project to undertake.27 
                                                          
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid, Ch. 8-1, http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP-4209/ch8-1.htm. 
27 Ibid, Ch. 8-2, http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP-4209/ch8-2.htm. 
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 After the Mid-Term Review, there were no major problems encountered by either of the 
agencies on their projects, and crews finished their training in early 1975.  The last portion in the 
United States began on February 7, and lasted for approximately two weeks.  The USSR flew its 
cosmonauts into America, where they were able to work together with their fellow astronauts for 
the first time.  During this time, the Soviet and American crewmembers stayed in Florida, where 
they, “practiced all the joint flight activities in the Apollo, Soyuz, and docking module mockups, 
using the latest version of the onboard flight documents.”28  All of this went smoothly, and the 
crews were able to converse and get to know one and other to a certain extent.  The American 
astronauts spoke rudimentary Russian, as the Russians spoke a certain amount of English.29  
Despite the language barrier, all were agreeable amongst one and other.  After this finished, 
further training took place in the Soviet Union between April 14 and 30.  The American 
astronauts saw for the first time the Baikonur Cosmodrome – a massive facility located in the 
desert of Kazakhstan.  Training in the USSR was much the same as in the USA, and finally, the 
two crews were declared ready for launch and the last remaining arrangements were made.30 
 Finally, on July 17, the docking was completed.  The two capsules were steered toward 
each other and linked together by their pilots, and soon the two crews were able to open their 
hatches and greet one and other.  These pioneers of international space cooperation took this all 
in stride, seeming more than anything to be satisfied by the success of the each stage of the 
mission.  In describing this moment, Ezell and Ezell wrote that, “The[ astronauts] appeared to 
accept their amazing technical accomplishment with the same nonchalance that had 
characterized their practice sessions in the ground simulators. There were no grand speeches, just 
                                                          
28 Ibid, Ch. 9-12, http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP-4209/ch9-12.htm. 
29 Ibid, Ch. 9-5, http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP-4209/ch9-5.htm. 
30 Ibid, Ch. 9-12. 
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a friendly greeting from men who seemed to have done this every day of their lives.”31  Without 
these men and the cooperation of the governments which they served, projects such as the 
International Space Station would have faced very different and, more than likely, more difficult 
paths towards realization.  The historic mission was a success, and one that would be 
remembered for generations to come. 
 Today, the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project is still remembered as a triumph of cooperation 
over rhetoric at a time when American and Soviet collaboration was far from a given.  Though 
the governments worked against each other in many ways, they also gave their space agencies 
the resources and the freedom that they needed to come together and avoid extending the Space 
Race, which surely would have wasted millions (if not billions) of dollars on different 
inefficiencies in the scientific method.  These agencies then worked together for years to figure 
out exactly to what extent they would be able to make certain joint missions work, and in what 
manner they would take place.  Today, joint Russian-American work in space continues, as 
American astronauts have ridden on Russian rockets to get to the space station since the US 
space shuttle program was ended in 2011.32  And Russians who are feeling particularly nostalgic 
for the Soviet Union or the victories that it achieved can still find and purchase souvenirs that 
were originally released by the Soviet government in 1975 on their local corner store’s shelves: a 
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